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Blood Relatives: Language, Immigration, and Education of
Ethnic Returnees in Germany and Japan
DEBORA HINDERLITER ORTLOFF AND CHRISTOPHER J. FREY
Introduction
Since 1989, large numbers of “ethnic returnees” have settled in Germany
and Japan. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 2.8 million Aussiedler, or
ethnic German returnees, came to Germany from the former Soviet Union.1
In Japan, immigration reform driven by low-skill labor shortages induced
nearly 300,000 Nikkeijin, or people of Japanese descent, to come from South
America in the 1990s. This article analyzes the development of language
education at the local and national level for the Aussiedler and Nikkeijin since
1989. In particular, we investigate how the policy makers and educators have
problematized the returnees and in what ways discourses of national identity,
citizenship, and belonging have (not) adapted to the slow integrations of
the Aussiedler and Nikkeijin into the larger German and Japanese communities.
In both Germany and Japan, analysis of immigrant policies (rights, ser-
vices, and protections for nonnationals) requires a brief discussion of both
countries’ immigration policies. These countries’ immigration and citizenship
policies have traditionally been based on jus sanguinis, the principle that one’s
nationality at birth is the same as that of one’s biological parents. These bound-
aries of nationality and citizenship close the door to many long-term, non-
national residents (such as the Turks in Germany and the Koreans in Japan)
but create openings for “ethnic” immigrants whose ancestors may have left
hundreds of years ago. One’s relationship to the nation is not spatial, but
hereditary, an ontological category. In the case of Germany, Stefan Senders
(2002, 88) points out that jus sanguinis reproduces the nation “in its own
image” and by definition is a rejection of diversity. The return of large num-
We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their thoughful comments and insights.
In addition, we owe many thanks to several faculty members who provided guidance, support, and
encouragement: Robert Arnove, Bradley Levinson, Luise McCarty, and Margaret Sutton.
1 Ethnic Germans from the regions east of Germany are called Aussiedler (repatriates), Spa¨taussiedler
(late repatriates), or, if they were expelled under the Potsdam Accords, Vertriebene (expellees). The
Aussiedler are those who returned between 1954 and 1993; the Spa¨taussiedler are those who arrived after
1993 legal reforms. However, Aussiedler will be used unless it is necessary to emphasize the legal differ-
ence. Aussiedler and Spa¨taussiedler are often referred to as Russian-Germans (Russland-Deutsche) or just
Russians, since the majority of them come from the former Soviet Union.
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bers of Aussiedler and Nikkeijin to Germany and Japan, respectively, in the
1990s challenged the foundations of ethnic identity in both countries.
The development of language education policies for the returnees over
the past 15 years also illustrates how national and local officials have prob-
lematized return migration and how notions of multiculturalism and national
identity have evolved. Our analysis of these policies suggests that the com-
prehensive national policy framework in Germany has not resulted in sub-
stantially better outcomes for the Aussiedler than the local and nongovern-
mental implementation framework we found in Japan. Previous studies, in
particular that of Betsy Brody (2002), have argued that the German model
should be used as an example of positive government involvement. However,
this ignores the persistent segregation the Aussiedler have experienced, and
thus increased government support appears unlikely greatly to improve the
situation of the Nikkeijin. Further, we will show that in the case of Aussiedler
and the Nikkeijin, whose heritage are tied to the notion of Germanness and
Japaneseness, respectively, the returnees’ inability to speak their ancestral
language is consistently offered as the primary reason for their lack of in-
tegration. Language deficits are the preoccupation of educational and gov-
ernment authorities in both countries, and consequently we posit that this
narrow focus on language emerges as the premiere means of distancing the
ethnic returnees from the “real” natives.
Literature Review
This comparative study of immigrant language education policy is framed
within the broader theoretical discourses on citizenship, immigrant integra-
tion, and multiculturalism. Much like Germany and Japan, other countries
have engaged in debates about immigration and citizenship. Denmark has
passed recent reforms to its immigration policies, and the German Immi-
gration Act of 2005 is modeled off an earlier Dutch law, which required
language and culture classes. In both Germany and Japan, immigration policy
is the sole purview of the federal government, whereas immigrant policy
formation and implementation, especially in education, has generally been
left to state and/or local governments. As we will see, this is changing in
Germany, though the Japanese central government has resisted taking action
in this arena.
Many authors have considered the challenge of immigrant language ed-
ucation and multiculturalism both in traditional immigrant nations (Ogbu
1978; Perlmann 1988) and in countries that have considered themselves
homogeneous (Suarez-Orozco 1991; Senders 2002). In Germany, there is a
large literature problematizing nationalism and exclusion in historical and
contemporary terms (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2000). Since unification, no-
tions of citizenship and multiculturalism have been interrogated, but edu-
cation is rarely discussed. The few notable exceptions consider textbook or
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curricular representations of the nation, community development, or psy-
chological perspectives (see Harris 1999; Dierkes 2003). These studies, how-
ever, do not explicitly examine immigrant education policies or practices.
Case studies of immigrant education practice mainly focus on economic
migrants, in particular Turkish-Germans (Hansen and Hornberg 1996; Hor-
rocks and Kolinsky 1996). For example, Luchtenberg (2004) found that there
is a strong emphasis on linguistic and religious differences as well as on the
perceived unwillingness of immigrants to integrate. Carole Hahn’s (1998)
comparative study sheds light on student political attitudes and pedagogical
style, and the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement (IEA) survey on civic education, led by Judith Torney-Purta
(2002), reveals much about student learning across the participating coun-
tries. In Germany, for example, the country mean measuring positive attitudes
toward immigrants was significantly lower than the international mean (Tor-
ney-Purta et al. 2001). The availability of the data for secondary analysis,
including the less-often used teacher data, may produce more literature on
teacher perceptions of citizenship education in Germany. Japan did not par-
ticipate in the IEA study. Moreover, none of these studies looked specifically
at the relationship between education and immigration policies.
In Japan, scholarship on multiculturalism has blossomed.2 Research on
Nikkeijin has focused on returnee identities (Tsuda 2002), integration issues
(Roth 2002; Hamada 2005), Latin American children who return to their
home countries after several years in Japan (Nakagawa 2000), and local im-
migrant policy (Watanabe 1995; Ikegami 2001). Most research on education
has focused on the problems faced by the Nikkeijin and their host schools.
O¯ba Sachio and colleagues (1998) found that language and school culture
were barriers to integration of young children but argued that kindergartens
were generally accommodating to Nikkeijin. O¯ta Haruo (2000) found that
Japanese middle schools were sites of assimilationist pressures (do¯ka asturyoku)
and deculturizing education (datsu bunkaka kyo¯iku) for non-Japanese students,
a problem compounded by language problems and the examination pres-
sures. Sekiguchi Tomoko (2003) found that assimilationist pressures were
stronger for Nikkeijin who identified as “pure” Japanese compared with those
of mixed parentage. With the exception of Brody (2002), little attention has
been given to education policy, especially in a comparative framework.
These literatures, taken collectively, show that in Germany and Japan
exclusion based on (ethnic) difference underlies fundamental notions of the
nation. In Japan, integration is only superficially thematized because for-
eigners are generally not expected to assimilate, while in Germany the strong
discourse about integration belies the pressure to assimilate to existing lin-
guistic, religious, and cultural norms. Examining language education policies
2 Mori 1997; Ryang 1997; Kerr 2000; Komai 2001; Røkkum 2006.
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becomes particularly important because through such an analysis we are
better able to comprehend the evolution of the respective national narratives.
In nations such as Germany and Japan, where there are long-standing and
dominant national languages, language proficiency is the first step toward
political, economic, and cultural participation. Likewise these language ed-
ucation policies have the potential to deny access and/or to demand forms
of assimilation. The case of the Aussiedler and the Nikkeijin is particularly
interesting because in the absence of traditional forms of “othering,” for
example, race, ethnicity, and religion, language emerges as the premiere
means of distancing the ethnic returnees from the “real” natives.
Because citizenship and immigration policies are nationally controlled,
it is imperative to consider national-level language education initiatives. Mar-
garet Sutton and Bradley Levinson (2001) aptly point out that local-level
practice often reinterprets policies in ways that require us to consider state
and local practices as well. Further, Germany and Japan have addressed the
needs of the ethnic returnees differently. Germany developed a strong na-
tional response but left implementation of educational directives to localities
(sometimes at the La¨nder level, but generally municipalities reacted as nec-
essary).3 In Japan, we see very little national-level policy and intense local
involvement. This difference further underscores the need to examine com-
paratively national and local language education policy.
Methodological Considerations
In order to capture this spectrum we designed a comparative case-study
design in which we examined national-level policies in both countries since
1989. For this we analyze both immigrant and immigration laws with close
attention to language education policy. We also interrogated federal and local
policies, through document analysis and interviews with stakeholders and key
informants. We chose two similar regions with significant return migrant
populations from which to gather local policy data. While the federal and
local analyses should not be generalized, within this greater comparative case
study they elucidate conflicts around integration and multiculturalism that
might otherwise remain unproblematized. In Germany, where education pol-
icy is the centralized at the La¨nder level, local-level school and community
responses to youth problems remain atomized and uncodified. As a result
we relied primarily on interviews with school directors, social service provid-
ers, government officials, and educational policy makers. In Japan, the lack
of national policy has led localities to develop a multitude of policy statements
(but few comprehensive policies), which were analyzed together with volu-
minous school policy reports, local and activist press, and community and
3 In Germany there are 16 federal states, or La¨nder, which control education policy, while citizenship
and immigrant policies are federally controlled.
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nongovernmental organization (NGO) publications. This was complemented
by interviews with public officials, local residents, and researchers. Key infor-
mant interviews, however, were helpful for interpretation and analysis. In terms
of validity we followed the standards of qualitative research using both peer
debriefing and member checks to confirm our interpretations of policy artifacts
and policy processes as explained through stakeholder interviews (Creswell
2005). By using multiple interview partners within each stakeholder group,
key informant interviews, and a myriad of policy artifacts and observations
gathered in multiple visits to our communities, we were able to triangulate
our data. Below the results of our analyses are detailed.
Historical Background of German and Japanese Citizenship Standards
German Citizenship and “Aussiedler”
Until recently, the dominant political rhetoric in Germany rejected mul-
ticulturalism in favor of the ethnocultural volk concept of citizenship. The
exclusivity of the volk concept, which maintained the appearance of a monocul-
tural state while disenfranchising the large number of non-German perma-
nent residents, was manifest through citizenship and immigration laws. These
laws were a means of continued cultural categorization of both immigrants
and Germans. Perhaps more important, they privileged the Aussiedler over
the economic migrant groups, in particular the Turkish guest workers, using
the existence of the former to deny full rights to the latter.
The interment and persecution of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union
and the expulsion of nearly 13 million Germans after World War II are the
primary justifications for ethnocultural citizenship (Brubaker 1992), which
for the Aussiedler was codified in Paragraph 116 of the German constitution.
Further, the 1959 Federal Law for Expellees and Refugees (Bundesvertriebe-
nengesetz) guaranteed the “right of return” and provided services to assist
returning ethnic Germans. Together these two laws codified the ethnocultural
nation.
The “right of return” was a policy in name only because the Soviet Union’s
restrictive travel policies kept the number of Aussiedler repatriates to approx-
imately 36,000 a year between 1950 and 1984 (Federal Ministry of the Interior,
Germany 2006b). Most of those returning were ethnically pure German fam-
ilies, who spoke German or older dialects. For the most part the integration
of these repatriates drew little attention from the majority population (In-
genhorst 1997). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 dramatically altered this
situation.
Between 1988 and 1998, 2.7 million repatriates, the vast majority from
the former Soviet Union, immigrated to Germany (Federal Ministry of the
Interior, Germany 2006b). A second wave of repatriates, who returned after
1993 and were called the Spa¨taussiedler, generally did not speak German, were
less likely to consider themselves to be ethnically German (Ingenhorst 1997),
452 November 2007
ORTLOFF AND FREY
and thus challenged the ethnocultural notion of being German. The laws
regulating Russian-German return became increasingly strict throughout the
1990s, and the political rhetoric shifted toward “maintaining” German her-
itage in Russia and restricting Aussiedler immigration. The tighter restrictions
rested mainly on “proving one’s Germanness” (Senders 2002, 89) and the
ability to speak German.
The sheer volume of the post-1993 Spa¨taussiedler and their perceived “Rus-
sianness” contributed to a political will for reform that was realized in the
highly contested Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), which was enacted
on January 1, 2005. This law was a complete paradigm shift, declaring that
Germany needs, desires, and welcomes immigrants; it also regulates the pur-
pose of immigration, eligibility for immigration, and conditions for depor-
tation. Most salient for our discussion, the 2005 act required 600 hours of
German language study and an “orientation to the German culture” course
for all adult immigrants. This was a major departure from earlier policy not
only because it was made applicable to all immigrants (and not just Aussiedler)
but also because it ventures into education policy—a political realm normally
reserved to the 16 federal states.
Japanese Citizenship and the “Nikkeijin”
Compared to the developments in Germany, the return of over 300,000
Nikkeijin to Japan since 1990 has caused fewer ripples. Since the mid-1980s,
the percentage of foreign residents in Japan has nearly doubled, to 1.57 percent
of the total population (Ministry of Justice, Japan 2006). However, few protested
when Foreign Minister Aso Taro¯ declared Japan a monolingual and mono-
cultural country in 2005 ( Japan Times 2005). Most national political leaders
refuse to acknowledge Japan’s ethnic diversity in favor of accessing the popular,
cultural nationalist view of Japanese homogeneity and uniqueness.
The vast majority of Nikkeijin in Japan returned from Brazil, whose Jap-
anese population grew quickly after the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 closed
U.S. borders to most Asian immigration. Around 205,000 Nikkeijin resided
Brazil by 1940, which today has the largest overseas Nikkeijin population (de
Carvalho 2003). Within Japan, citizenship rights for non-Japanese expanded
and contracted in tandem with Japan’s colonial empire. The indigenous Ainu
in Hokkaido were declared commoners (heimin) in 1871 and were entered
into family registries (koseki) after 1875 (Siddle 1996). Colonial expansion
into Taiwan and continental Asia brought millions of Koreans, Taiwanese,
and Chinese to Japan before 1945. For the most part, colonial subjects re-
siding in Japan were granted considerable rights, including the right to vote.
But after World War II, the government reclassified non-Japanese as foreign
aliens (1947) and stripped them of citizenship in 1952 (Sugimoto 2003),
(re)establishing an exclusivist, blood-based immigration regime that strictly
regulated foreign immigration (Morris-Suzuki 2006).
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While West Germany enshrined space for the Ausseidler in national law,
the opening of a “side door” for Nikkeijin in the 1990s grew out of demand
for unskilled workers in Japan and the economic instability in Brazil in the
1980s. Strong economic growth and increasing domestic labor shortages in
the late 1970s and 1980s attracted undocumented workers, mostly from
Southeast Asia and Iran, to the dangerous (kiken), dirty (kitanai), and de-
manding (kitsui) “3K” jobs in small factories around Tokyo. Media scares
over foreign crime and pressure from manufacturers and some government
ministries for more low-skill labor resulted in revisions to the Immigration
Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Shunyukokukanri oyobi nanmin ninteiho)
in 1990 (Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). The act attempted to balance demand
for unskilled laborers and concerns about cultural and racial homogeneity
by allowing Nikkeijin up to the third generation to apply for renewable “settler”
(teiju¯) visas and also allowing them to work in low-skill positions. By 1996,
nearly 230,000 Nikkeijin, about 180,000 from Brazil, were residing in Japan,
up from just a few thousand 10 years earlier (Brody 2002). By 2004, the
number of Nikkeijin in Japan has stabilized around 330,000; about 280,000
of those were Nikkei-Brazilian (Higuchi 2005).
Assumptions that second- and third-generation Nikkeijin would either
quickly adapt or not settle in Japan turned out to be false. Though some
Nikkeijin had enrolled in Japanese-language schools in their home countries,
few spoke Japanese fluently, and World War II–era assimilation policies in
Brazil caused most Nikkeijin to sever their cultural ties to Japan. As this com-
parison will show, the immigrant policies in Germany and Japan have evolved
from very different historical foundations and in different directions, but the
results for the Aussiedler and the Nikkeijin have not been markedly different.
National-Level Adult Immigrant Language Education Policies Compared
Germany: Reaction and Reform
Over the past 15 years support for language training at the national level
has changed considerably. Indeed, the nature of citizenship, the nature of
immigration, and the status of the Aussiedler and foreigners have been sub-
jected to public scrutiny and reform. These reforms often have acquisition
of the German language as the central feature even as they more holistically
address immigrant integration. Below we will briefly summarize the initial
language education policies before examining the policies developed since
2005.
The Federal Expellee Law granted Aussiedler right of entry and established
a Guarantee Fund for emergency housing, a 10-month language course, and
job training for returnees. Three years after the first major wave of Aussiedler
migrated to Germany, the 1959 law was replaced with the Law for Settling
the Consequences of War (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz of 1993), which aimed
to limit the number of Aussiedler immigrants. This law no longer accepted
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that all people of German heritage living in the former East Bloc were per-
secuted. It is the first in a series of changes to immigration policies, which
ultimately also changed immigrant policies by addressing language services.
It also shortened the German-language course to 6 months, just as the number
of returnees requiring that service increased. In 1996, the government re-
quired a language test to prove Spa¨taussiedler status, which resulted in many
Aussiedler spouses and children being categorized as foreigners and thus being
denied special services, including language classes, for repatriates. Now, how-
ever, all foreigners have access to these services under the 2005 Immigration
Act.
Between the initial swell of Aussiedler immigration and the passage of the
Immigration Act, the Aussiedler maintained their special, separate legal status,
but public discourse began to demand integration of all foreigners, including
Russian-Germans. Ability to speak German was held up as an absolute min-
imum requirement for immigration and continued residence, and the Aus-
siedler became seen not as “returnees” but as foreigners who needed to be-
come German by learning German. One school director in charge of adult
classes declared: “The only thing German about them [Aussiedler] is that their
dog peed on a German oak tree somewhere in Siberia. They need to take
the time to learn German if they want to live here and be a part of Germany.”
However, federal provisions under the Guarantee Fund for Aussiedler inte-
gration measures and language training were meager. In 1997, for example,
when roughly 98,000 Aussiedler entered the country, DM 3 million, or about
US$1.5 million, was spent on so-called integration aid for Aussiedler—equiv-
alent to about US$15 per person. Nearly one-half of this money went to
language training (InfoDienst Deutsch-russische Ausgabe 1997).
The 2005 Immigration Act expanded the government’s commitment to
immigrant integration in the form of language-training courses for all im-
migrants, regardless of heritage. Access to these courses, which are modeled
on the initial language and orientation course once offered only to Aussiedler,
is legally guaranteed by the act. The 2005 federal budget line items i208
million for language courses for foreigners (Federal Ministry of the Interior,
Germany 2006a). The federal government carries the full cost for the lan-
guage courses, enough to enroll 138,000 newly arrived immigrants and 56,000
current resident aliens. After 2005, family members of Aussiedler were eligible
for language training, whereas their former status as foreigners had excluded
them from this right. With the expansion of the course to all groups and the
federal control of the policies, the government recognized the need to com-
mit financial and human resources to immigrant integration. The newly
renamed and reorganized Federal Office for Migration and Refugees oversees
most federal integration measures and coordinates state and local efforts.
The ordinance regulating integration courses specifies course details, in par-
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ticular curriculum design and content and also the length and certification
procedures for course providers.
Clearly this new law represents a considerable change in the nature of
citizenship and immigration in Germany. For the Aussiedler, in particular, it
further reduces their special status and also standardizes and attempts to
equalize immigrant services. Sanctions for not completing the language
course, primarily a 10 percent reduction in welfare benefits, are aimed at all
immigrants. With the 2005 Immigration Act, language became the central
criterion for integration of adults, and consequently language education pol-
icies now form the crux of federal policies on adult immigrant integration.
This has an added effect on the Spa¨taussiedler. As of 2005, all people applying
to be repatriated based on heritage and their family members (most of whom
will have had no exposure to German previously) have to pass a basic German
test (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany 2006b). While heritage and
Soviet-era persecution remain important factors for repatriation, knowledge
of German has emerged as the deciding factor in granting repatriate status.
Japan: Adult Education Policies
Unlike the German case, there are no national-level policies for adult
Nikkeijin in Japan. As a result, the responsibility for adult immigrant education
programs has fallen to local authorities and volunteers. In this section, we
address how the adult immigrant education infrastructure has grown out of
the existing adult education services sector and how recent legal change and
proposals may extend language programs for adult immigrants.
Japan’s century-old lifelong learning system was revised in 1990 under
the Lifelong Learning Promotion Law (Sho¯gai gakushu¯ shinko¯ ho¯ ). Like the
immigration reforms the same year, this law sprang from anxiety over Japan’s
creative capacities and its aging population (Ishikida 2005). At the national
level, at least, the expansion of adult education in the 1990s did not envelop
the needs of Japan’s foreign populations. However, although the local gov-
ernmental and social organizations hosting adult education programs have
wide curricular latitude driven by the interest and initiative of local residents,
for the most part the adult education services sector has not expanded its
services for immigrants.
Much like Germany, the labor shortages in comparatively high-skill health-
care and technology industries may expand the central government’s role in
immigrant policy, especially in adult education. In the summer of 2006, Lower
House member and then Senior Vice Minister for Justice Ko¯no Taro¯ proposed
opening the “front door” to highly skilled foreign workers (Ko¯no 2006). Like
many education and immigration laws of the past 2 decades, Ko¯no’s proposed
changes were driven by concerns over economic competitiveness, the aging
workforce, and fears of foreigner crime. Much of Ko¯no’s proposal focuses
on Japanese language proficiency. Like the 2005 German revisions, this plan
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would require foreign workers to have basic Japanese language ability upon
entering the country. In addition, continued residency in Japan would be
contingent on regular, marked progress in the language, and immigrant
children would be required to attend school. Acknowledging some of the
difficulties low-skill workers face in Japan, the plan also calls for equal treat-
ment of foreign workers in labor and housing, although it stops short of
calling for antidiscrimination laws. The most controversial aspect of this pro-
posal would gradually allow the number of foreign residents in Japan to
double, to about 3 percent of the total population.
New agreements also extend Japanese language requirements to new
high-skill workers (Yomiuri Shimbun 2006). The increasing need for home
help workers (kaigosha) induced the Japanese government to agree to admit
1,000 Filipino nurses in 2007 and 2008 under the 2006 Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA). Those admitted will study Japanese during their first 6
months of residence, and government-mandated classes will be paid for by
Japanese employers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2006). After 3 years,
the nurses must also pass the Japanese medical board exams in Japanese to
be allowed to remain in Japan. Like the 2005 revisions in Germany, these
changes represent steps away from jus sanguinis immigration law. These new
frameworks close the “side door” for Nikkeijin in favor of an “open door” that
privileges credentials, selected skills, and language ability.
National Level Education Policies for Youth
Germany—Language Education Policies for Youth
Unlike Japan, public education in Germany is constitutionally a state
(Land) responsibility. School organization, immigrant education practices,
teacher training, and language education policies are therefore all decided
at that level. However, some generalities exist—specifically, the shortage of
teachers trained in Deutsch als Fremdsprache (German as a foreign language
[DaF]). Although there are a wide variety of DaF programs within Germanic
Studies departments, these are part of the masters’ programs and not com-
patible with the state examination program required for teacher licensing.
For the most part, DaF remains an elective secondary field for elementary
and Hauptschule (school form ending at ninth grade) preservice teachers.
The teacher education programs for the two other common school forms,
the Realschule (tenth grade) and Gymnasium (college preparatory), rarely in-
clude DaF as a secondary field, because the entrance examinations keep most
foreigners who need language training out of these schools (Auernheimer
2006).
The emphasis on early tracking in the German education system and its
tripartite division at the secondary level (Phillips 1995) help explain why the
2003 Program of International Student Assessment found that Germany has
the highest correlation between student class and educational achievement
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(OECD 2006). Although there has been some movement away from this
tracking in some La¨nder, the tripartite system itself is not being seriously
challenged. For immigrants, regardless of their German heritage, this is par-
ticularly true. Nearly every teacher, administrator, or government official in-
terviewed stated confidently that the Aussiedler “only have a chance if they
start out in Kindergarten here.” In several federal states children were tracked
after completing sixth grade, but in many others this happens as early as
fourth grade. As Jim Cummins (2001) reminds us, academic language de-
velopment generally takes 4–7 years, making it difficult for foreign students
who do not start their education in Germany to progress to high school and
beyond. A school director explained: “Our Russians [Aussiedler] who came
here as older students, even eight or nine, have not done well. And the
teenagers, they are a lost generation; they have nowhere to go and nothing
to do. But what could they do with no German and no desire to be here in
this community?”
Finally, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cul-
tural Affairs of the La¨nder in the Federal Republic of Germany (KMK), the
federal body charged with providing nonbinding oversight and guidance to
the 16 federal states, has not addressed DaF as an area of reform. This
conference offers guidelines but also creates policies, which must be signed
by all 16 state ministers to take effect. De facto this represents federal policy,
although implementation ultimately rests within state rights. It is therefore
interesting that despite a comprehensive report on teacher training, there is
no mention of intercultural competencies or German as a Foreign Language,
despite the fact that both of these areas are underdeveloped in teacher train-
ing programs (Sta¨ndigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der La¨nder in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1999). However, a 2004 decision that forwards
standards for teacher education does include, as one of eleven core com-
petencies, social and cultural knowledge of students as a means of differ-
entiating instruction (Sekretariat der Sta¨ndigen Konferenz der Kultusminister
der La¨nder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2004). Yet, there is still a
question of the effectiveness of KMK guidelines, as a 1996 decision to require
intercultural education in the curricula has been followed, as one education
policy maker in Bavaria explained, in name only: “We have it in our curricula,
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg has it in their curricula, and I think the other states do
too, but teachers don’t really know what to do with it, and since it is not
tested we have no real way of knowing if it is there.”
Japan: Policies of Convenience
The Ministry of Education, Sports, and Technology (MEXT, or
Monbukagakusho¯) has resisted adapting the Japanese educational system to
meet the needs of immigrant children, and its policy of leaving immigrant
education to localities suggests that that it views the Nikkeijin as short-term
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guest workers rather than residents. To date, MEXT has assumed a coordi-
nating function among different educational agencies but has not produced
clear guidelines for immigrant education. The ministry’s policies for immi-
grant children have been appended to much more elaborate provisions for
the education of the kikokushijo (children of home country returnees). These
are children who were educated abroad, usually when a parent was dispatched
to an overseas management position. As we will see, fusion of these two very
different populations under a single policy umbrella mirrors a similar practice
at the local level.
The Ministry of Education, Sports, and Technology has identified five
priorities for returnee and immigrant education. Under closer scrutiny, how-
ever, it is clear that funding and support measures are heavily weighted in
favor of the kikokushijo, while those for immigrant children are limited to
“projects” to address and “encourage” Nikkeijin children to fully participate
in Japanese schools, on Japanese terms. Programs for Nikkeijin education are
limited to research projects for educational support and reducing absentee-
ism, encouraging integration, limited teacher training, and publishing a four-
page Japanese as a Second Language curriculum. By comparison, measures
for the kikokushijo include 19 university-affiliated high schools and positive
discrimination (sekkyokuteki ukeiri) measures in university admissions (Ichi
1983), policies that have been extended to neither their fellow “returnee”
cousins nor any other minority group in Japan (Goodman 2003).
The reasons for the positive discrimination measures for the kikokushijo
and the absence of meaningful policies for the Nikkeijin hinge on citizenship
and yet transcend ethnicity. Even though Nikkeijin are among the most priv-
ileged newcomers to Japan, relatively few have sought Japanese citizenship
because of their strong, if yet unrealized, desire to return permanently to
Brazil. In contrast, the kikokushijo were already citizens of Japan, expected
educational support from the state, and have mostly resettled in Japan per-
manently. The few privileges enjoyed by the Nikkeijin in the labor market
have not been transferable to the education sector. This only reinforces the
official view of the Nikkeijin as “temporary” and “foreign” and ignores the
growing diversity of Japanese schools (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999).4
Similar to Germany, there are very few Japanese as an Additional Lan-
guage ( JAL) programs at Japanese universities, and the subject is not certified
by prefectural boards of education. Existing JAL programs focus on preparing
instructors for university settings and are unaffiliated with schools of edu-
cation. Before public school programs can be established, the teacher training
infrastructure in Japan must be developed.
4 The authors wish to thank Onai Taoru at Hokkaido University for his interpretations regarding
the lack of national policy.
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Adult Education Policies and Programs at the Local Level
Germany: Adult Education Policies at the Local Level
Stemming from the national-level policy changes discussed above, adult
language education policies at the local level have seen significant changes
over the past 15 years. Initially, under the federal guidelines for repatriate
support, a federally funded 6-month language course was implemented by
local communities in response to repatriate settlement. The language course
was normally taught in the local People’s Colleges (Volkshochschule), which
initially maintained strong curricular control. Much like the current guide-
lines established in the 2005 Immigration Act, ethnic German returnees were
required to attend 25 hours of instruction a week. Pedagogy and teacher
training were not established federally and differed by state and municipality.
These differences, in part, are held up as the reason for the general failure
of Aussiedler adults to learn German, though there are no official statistics to
support this, partly because Aussiedler are not separated out in reports. Further,
few anticipated that most older Aussiedler would resist learning German once
they resettled. Summarizing the problems with the old courses, a social worker
in charge of repatriate counseling in a large urban area said: “The courses
were sometimes good and sometimes not good. They failed to consider how
hard it is for an older person to learn a language. . . . But more importantly,
I think, and this does not change with the new policy, is that there was a lack
of will. Most of them had no reason to learn German. They were not going
to find a job, and they knew this, and the German community did not make
them want to venture out of their little Russian enclaves.” This assessment
seems particularly important given the new language courses prescribed by
the 2005 Immigration Act; the Immigration Act cannot force change within
the German community, nor can it make immigrants learn German.
As the federal government sought to require German-language training
for all immigrant groups, it examined the failures of the Aussiedler language
courses and, with centralization, attempted to improve outcomes. With the
Immigration Act, as discussed above, curriculum was centralized and taught
by teachers who are either formally trained in DaF or have attended a special
continuing education certificate course developed by the federal government.
While there has been only one initial assessment of these language courses,
there are already implementation problems. In addition, differentiated in-
struction, a recommended change from the earlier, Aussiedler-only language
courses, has been difficult. Resource constraints, particularly in rural areas,
compound the challenge of offering differentiated instruction to the mainly
Spa¨taussiedler population. Teacher certification is also uneven. An interim
assessment conducted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior reported that
roughly 60 percent of instructors have neither a degree nor federal DaF
certification (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany 2006a). Furthermore,
nearly 85 percent of the teachers are adjuncts, meaning that they have no
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permanent relationship to their employer. Despite greater federal oversight,
locally employed teachers remain underqualified and in precarious employ-
ment situations that make the profession unattractive to highly qualified
individuals.
Although the 2005 act was a significant compromise between federal and
state powers, local officials still must deal with ongoing negotiations between
the states, who implement the programs, and the federal government, which
oversees the coordinated integration program. In our interviews, state and
local officials consistently called for stricter regulations and for the authority
at the state level to enforce them. The “failure” to integrate is viewed as a
lack of enforcement tools. The mayor of one small town with a 25 percent
Aussiedler population summarizes what nearly all the officials interviewed ex-
pressed: “The new [language and integration] courses are fine and a good
idea. But they will never work if we don’t make them attend. We know this
from the Russians [Aussiedler]. They had every advantage, more advantages
then any German would have, and most of them still sit there in there groups
and speak Russian all day long.”
The federal interim assessment of the program also found deficits in state
services. The 2005 act established integration counseling services (staffed by
social workers with intercultural training) to accompany language and in-
tegration courses. Social workers are state employees, and as such these im-
migration services must be established and paid for by the state. The federal
report recommends strengthening the language in the law to enforce state
responsibilities in this area. Interviews with social workers tasked with im-
migration counseling confirmed that resources are tight. Initially, most of
these social workers provided services only for Aussiedler ; now they are re-
sponsible for all immigrants.
Local Level Adult Education Policies in Japan
As we have seen, local and prefectural officials have discretion about what
is taught in adult education courses in Japan, and there are few curricular
prescriptions for lifelong learning from the Ministry of Education (MEXT).
Thus, local lifelong learning programs tend to reflect both the organizational
ability and educational demands of the local population, the Nikkeijin in-
cluded. The availability of adult education services at the local level can
illustrate the degree to which foreign residents, and in this case the Nikkeijin,
have been accepted and incorporated into the existing social service and
educational infrastructure.
Lifelong learning projects in Toyota City, where a significant number of
Nikkeijin reside, operate out of a network of neighborhood “exchange halls”
(ko¯ryu¯kan) administered by the local government. A wide variety of courses
and programs are available, including health and safety classes, instruction
in traditional Japanese arts, and other courses that are in demand from local
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residents. At Homi-danchi, where about half of the 10,000 residents are Nik-
keijin, all of the courses listed for the fall of 2006 appear to be directed at
the Japanese residents (Homi ko¯ryu¯kan 2006). Although two nonprofit or-
ganizations (NPOs) hold Japanese-language classes there, none are regularly
scheduled, and none of the information for the courses has been translated
into Portuguese. This was found across Toyota City and in other communities
and strongly suggests that Nikkeijin are not seeking or not being provided
with courses through the existing adult education infrastructure.
Under the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (Tokutei
hienri katsudo¯sokushin ho¯), NGOs and NPOs have assumed much of the re-
sponsibility for implementing immigrant education policies across Japan. Typ-
ical among these is the NPO Nihongo kyo¯shitsu ( Japanese Classroom) in Toyota
City, which operates volunteer-staffed classes. The class meets for 2 hours on
Sunday afternoons, and the group charges very nominal fees for the partic-
ipating adults, who are mostly from China and Brazil. The city also provides
introductory training courses for volunteer teachers. Despite their availability,
language courses like these are often not widely advertised, and many Nikkeijin
are not comfortable using municipal services due to language barriers and
concerns about legal status. In addition, the courses often conflict with other
activities, such as church or family obligations. Perhaps most important, many
are simply too exhausted from work to study Japanese on the weekends (Hir-
ataka et al. 2001). From an institutional perspective, the reliance on volunteers
illustrates the undeveloped nature of immigrant services in Japan and the
reluctance of government officials to fund services for non-Japanese. Herman
Smith’s (1995, 108) criticism that the Japanese adult education system was a
“low priority and of low status” can also be said of immigrant services.
The belief among many Nikkeijin that their stay in Japan is temporary
also complicates their integration into the broader Japanese community. A
recent survey of eight prefectures by Hamada Kunisuke (2005) found that
only 13 percent of Nikkei-Brazilians planned to settle in Japan, while 46.8
percent planned to return home when they had saved some money, and 30
percent said they would return to Brazil “no matter what” (nani ga attemo
kikoku). However, Hamada also found that a higher percentage of Nikkeijin
who have been in Japan over 10 years were willing to return to Brazil only
if they could find a good job there, suggesting that many long-term residents
have established relatively comfortable lives in Japan.
The transnational lives of those Nikkeijin known as ripiitaa (repeaters) is
a significant difference from the Aussiedler experience and has resulted in
educational underinvestment by the Japanese government and the Nikkeijin
themselves. For the Nikkeijin, this becomes a significant hindrance to work-
place advancement and is a particularly high barrier for their children given
the heavy emphasis on entrance examinations at the high school and uni-
versity levels. The repeater phenomenon also reinforces the central govern-
462 November 2007
ORTLOFF AND FREY
ment’s view that foreigners are transient and do not require services, a logic
that Tsuda Takeyuki and Wayne Cornelius (2004) argue makes the presence
of foreign workers more acceptable to the Japanese public.
Coupled with Nikkeijin reluctance and/or inability to invest in education,
the central government’s inactivity reinforces a circle of educational under-
investment. It seems clear that the central government must take the lead
in expanding Japanese language classes, as well as taking measures to assure
immigrants that their labor and housing rights are protected, before Nikkeijin
and other immigrants will reciprocate the investment necessary for their long-
term settlement in Japan.
Local Education Policies in Public Schools
Germany—Language Education Policies in the Public Schools
In one year we went from having two non-Germans, both of whom were
born here, to having 45 Aussiedler who spoke no German. We were com-
pletely unprepared; we had no materials, no training, no space, and ba-
sically no idea where to start. At first it was OK, we sort of did the best
we could with what we had. But then the German parents started to
complain. They did not want the teachers spending all their time teaching
somebody to speak German when their child needed to learn the fourth-
grade material. (School Director, in a small community that nearly dou-
bled in size in a 7-year period due to Aussiedler immigration)
This community’s experience is not isolated. Schools in formerly ho-
mogenous rural areas were unprepared for the language-learning needs of
the Aussiedler. In subsequent years, individual schools learned to accommo-
date the language learners, and textbook publishers now produce good ma-
terials for these classes. However, as discussed earlier, the school structure
and lack of trained DaF teachers are a consistent problem at the local level.
School directors in each of the 25 schools visited for this study all reported
a lack of financial and human resources to address language learning needs.
In most schools none of the teachers had DaF certification, and the least
senior teachers were pushed into tutoring. In addition, La¨nder-level funding
cuts have severely limited the time dedicated to DaF classes, leaving DaF
instruction to the initiative of the individual teachers.
When asked what was needed to improve integration for the Russian-
German youth, every single stakeholder interviewed—from mayors to teach-
ers to education policy makers to social workers—replied “they have to learn
the language.” Most school directors desired more money for language
courses and a definitive and lasting policy for DaF programs. At the La¨nder
level (where education policy is created) there have been a variety of school-
based initiatives to assist immigrant children, but they are small-scale. By way
of example, Bavarian Minister President Edmund Stoiber announced in July
2006 that no child should enter a German school without adequate German
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knowledge and pledged to require German-language courses in preschools
for nonnative speakers (Bayerisches Staatsministerium fuer Arbeit und So-
zialordnung, Familie und Frauen 2006). The school directors welcomed this
announcement but doubted that it would be adequately funded. In a system
that relies on strong and consistent state policy, the absence of clear guidelines
meant that individual schools could only react to the specific situations pre-
sented to them. We do not mean to suggest that individual school and teachers
are uncaring or callous about the needs of the Spa¨taussiedler children. Countless
administrators and teachers bemoaned that they could not do more. However,
the lack of government policy, at both the federal and La¨nder levels, has created
bureaucratic confusion at the school level about the appropriate language
policies for immigrant children, regardless of their heritage.
Japan: Grasping for Frameworks, Problematizing the Foreign
As we have seen, in the absence of MEXT guidance, local and prefectural
authorities assumed responsibility for immigrant education policy making in
the early 1990s. In this case, teachers, principals, and local school officials
looked to policies established in the 1970s for the “returnee children,” or
kikokushijo, as a framework for immigrant education. This seems reasonable
given that Nikkeijin settled in manufacturing centers like Toyota City, Ha-
mamatsu, and O¯ta, home to Toyota, Yamaha, and Subaru, respectively. Nik-
keijin found work in the second- and third-tier firms affiliated with the larger
companies, who had for many years sent mid- and upper-level managers and
engineers abroad for 3–4 years at a time. As a result, there were established
networks and policies for kikokushijo. The pairing of returnee and immigrant
education policies, however, was a marriage of convenience masking consid-
erable differences in the needs of the students (Shipper 2002).
Used partly out of necessity, the kikokushijo policy framework was also the
sole existing discourse of difference in Japanese public education, even
though research in the past 2 decades has shown that most kikokushijo ex-
perience few problems readjusting to Japan (Goodman 2003). By combining
kikokushijo and immigrant education policies, educational institutions only
address student deficits in relation to Japanese educational expectations and
almost completely ignore the cultural or linguistic backgrounds of immigrant
students. As a result, the adjustment problems that Nikkeijin experience are
attributed to language difficulty, much like the kikokushijo and the Aussiedler.
More important, foreign children are not required to attend school in Japan,
freeing MEXT from organizing programs for them. Most Nikkeijin children,
especially if they arrive after age 10, learn only colloquial Japanese in school,
while their Portuguese-language skills atrophy.
The high absentee rates among foreign children is causing increasing
concern both at the local and national levels. According to Sekiguchi Tomoko
(2005, 2), in both 2000 and 2005, slightly over 40 percent of Nikkeijin children
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in Japan did not attend school; ominously, the number of children not at-
tending school more than doubled during that time, from about 7,000 to
17,000. There are many reasons for this: social discrimination, language prob-
lems, and residential instability are most commonly cited. Rather than ad-
dressing these issues, officials regularly cite Nikkeijin crime as the most pressing
problem relating to student dropouts (Shipper 2005), with the concomitant
desire to prevent the creation of a foreigner underclass that would produce a
“reserve army of juvenile delinquents” in the Nikkeijin community (Yamanaka
2006, 114).
Although kikokushijo children have come to represent Japan’s interna-
tionalization, both national and local policy frameworks present immigrant
children as a problem to be “dealt with” or the object of “countermeasures”
(taisaku). At the local level, the discourse and policies constructed around
the Nikkeijin focus on linguistic deficiencies and truancy ( fushu¯gaku), though
often wrapped in a veil of “internationalization” (Miyajima and O¯ta 2005).
Municipal internationalization efforts are threefold: providing (1) services
for Japanese students who are residing overseas, (2) foreign language and
cultural exchange, and (3) programs for foreign children residing in the
community (Toyota City 2006). Our analysis of Toyota City’s policy goals
suggests that lines between “Japanese” and “foreign” are studiously main-
tained. Programs for resident foreigners mostly consist of lectures by outside
experts, data gathering, and coordination with NPOs to help truant students.
Few measures have clear goals, and outside of hiring a Japanese-language
teacher, these projects demand little funding. In contrast, the city sends two
teachers abroad every year for overseas Japanese students and supports ex-
change trips abroad to the United States and the United Kingdom. Beyond
the financial commitment, these programs draw clear lines around the kind
of internationalization that is envisioned for Toyota City: language and cul-
tural exchanges with (industrialized) English-speaking countries and the
maintenance of a “Japanese” education for residents of Toyota City, even
when they live overseas; Nikkeijin are generally not expected to contribute to
“internationalization.” Rather, the measures mainly address problems that
foreign students have adapting to the Japanese system or their refusal to
attend school at all (Toyota City 2005). These challenges are compounded
in Japan by a general unwillingness to even acknowledge the substantial non-
Japanese population, and by underdevelopment of research, educational,
activist, and political organizations to address and push for solutions for
Japan’s foreign populations.
Discussion
This comparative policy study of immigrant and immigration policy has
shown that, despite similar ethno-national, jus sanguinis definitions of citi-
zenship and community, Germany and Japan have forged starkly different
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immigrant and immigration policies for the Aussiedler and the Nikkeijin. The
difference can be explained by the rhetorical and political use of the Aussiedler
in West Germany (Levy 2003), the need for low-wage labor in Japan, and the
extent to which the central governments acknowledge the presence of and
provide services for their long-term foreign residents. The resulting policy
frameworks could not have been more different: citizenship, compulsory
education, financial and housing support, and extensive, free language classes
for the Ausseidler, compared with ad hoc, volunteer language classes; limited
educational opportunities; and little to no political, financial, or housing
support from any level of government for the Nikkeijin. Despite these differ-
ences, several of the outcomes have been strikingly similar: a paucity of
German/Japanese as a Second Language teachers and a resulting reliance
on untrained or volunteer teachers; the emergence of “language” as the
primary problem for immigrants; overarching expectations of immigrant as-
similation to the dominant culture, mostly through language acquisition; and
concern about foreigner crime. It would appear that the outcomes from the
strong government interventions in Germany and the laissez-faire policy in
Japan are not so different.
The immigration policy framework that has developed in Germany in
recent years suggests that language, skills, and education are becoming more
important than the volk in determining who will be welcomed as German.
Other minority groups, such as the Turkish-Germans and asylum seekers, are
put on more equal ground with the repatriates through this movement.
Recent developments also suggest that similar changes are brewing in Japan,
in both low- and high-skill sectors, in light of its aging and shrinking popu-
lation. However, if both countries move toward accepting more immigrants
in the future, successful integration will require more than language classes
and exams. The belief that immigrants will automatically assimilate into the
existing community once they learn the national language ignores the dif-
ferent worldviews, religious and political beliefs, and social memory that im-
migrants bring into their host countries. Similarly, the education policy, par-
ticularly citizenship education and the humanities curriculum, must adapt
to the expanded borders of citizenship and ethnicity. Though the national
discourse has, at least officially, changed in Germany, it remains to be seen
if similar changes will occur in schools. The likelihood of this happening in
Japan seems rather more remote, given the recent “patriotic” reforms to
Japanese civic education (Tokita 2006).
Analysis of national and local immigrant education policies in Germany
and Japan suggests that for the past 15 years, the burden of accommodation
has been placed squarely on the returnees themselves, because of the per-
ception that—as Germans or Japanese—they would quickly revert to their
ancestral language and culture. The slow pace of integration and/or assim-
ilation of the Aussiedler has initiated a reevaluation of immigration policy as
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well as the monoculturalism that marked the first decade of German im-
migrant policy. Germany also has adopted new immigration policies that
require German language capability and testing to ensure adequate progress,
a plan that is also under consideration in Japan. However, it remains to be
seen whether Japan will follow a similar course in revising its immigration
policies and acknowledging its growing immigrant population as a permanent
and vital part of Japanese society.
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